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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
APPLIED TO TRUSTS.*
Those familiar with the rules of law concerning the dura-
tion of trust estates, have learned that private trusts may
not be created for unlimited lengths of time. The rule of
law controlling the duration of private trusts, is the rule
known as "The Rule against Perpetuities." The Law per-
mits the establishment of private trusts for only reasonable
lengths of time, so as not permanently to withdraw from
commerce the realty and personalty bequeathed in trust.
The rule does not apply to charitable or benevolent trusts,
as such trusts may continue indefinitely, or, in contemplation
of law, perpetually.
RULE LIMITING DURATION OF TRUSTS.
Under the rule against perpetuities, private trusts may
be created for the life of the last survivor of any number of
designated persons, in being at the commencement of the
trust, and for period of 21 years thereafter. If at the death
of the survivor there be any unborn beneficiary in gestation,
additional time is allowed for the birth of such posthumous
beneficiary. The period of gestation varieg, and usually does
not extend beyond nine or ten months. If a trust be created
by will, the time of commencement of the trust is the date
of death of testator. If a trust be created by conveyance or
transfer in trust, the time of commencement of the trust is
the execution and delivery of the instrument.
ORIGIN OF RULE.
The rule against perpetuities, as applied to an accumu-
*By Frederick Vierling, of St. Louis, Mo.
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lating trust, was for the first time applied by the courts of
England in 1799, in the famous case known as the Thellusson
case.1 Up to that time, there was no case definitely deciding
for how long a time a trusteeship might be made to continue.
Thellusson died in 1797, leaving a will dated 1796. After
making provisions for his wife and a number of others, he
devised and bequeathed the residue of his estate in trust to
accumulate for the lives of his three sons and such of their
issue as should be living at the time of his death or born in
due time afterwards. He directed, on the death of the sur-
vivor of said beneficiaries, that the estate should be divided
in three parts and conveyed and transferred to the then bene-
ficiaries absolutely and free of trust. At the time of Thellus-
son's death, he was survived by fifteen descendants, namely:
his three sons and their issue. It appeared that the estate
would be tied up from alienation and enjoyment for three
generations.
DECISIONS DECLARING RULE.
Suit was brought to have the Thellusson trust declared
void, on the ground that the period of time specified for the
trust to continue was too remote. It was urged that most
attempts to create perpetuities are made with a view to con-
tinuing the enjoinment of property for a long series of years
in the families of the testators; that Thellusson contrives
how long it is possible to keep any of his descendants from
the enjoyment of his property; that no one who had ever
breathed the same air with Thellusson could inherit; that he
excludes three generations from all chance of enjoyment; that
Thellusson did not wish to continue the property in his fam-
ily, but to preclude his family and all mankind from alienat-
ing and even enjoying his property during the longest possible
period; that, by carrying out Thellusson's plan, only a revenue
1. 4 Ves. Jr. 237.
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equal to the civil list of England may, by no very remote
possibility, be centered in one family, with absolute command
over the capital. Prior to the hearing of the Thellusson case,
the courts of England held that the period of limitation of
an executory devise is "a life or lives in being and twenty-
one years and a few months," to allow the birth of posthumous
children; that, under such rule, the vesting of an estate, given
by way of an executory devise, is restrained only during the
life of one person, the survivor; that restraint for such period
does not tend to a perpetuity; that, if any devisee be a minor,
the law itself would restrain alienation until the devisee
became of age; that it was permissible, by way of executory
devise, to include posthumous children as devisees. Having
the precedent therefor set with respect to an executory de-
vise, in deciding the Thellusson case the Court concluded
it would follow such precedent and held that trusts may be
created for any terms certain to end Within periods not ex-
ceeding periods permitted for estates granted by way of
executory devise.
LIMITATIONS AT COMMON LAW.
Before the enactment in England in 1535 of the Stat-
ute of Uses and in 1540 of the Statute of Wills, no ques-
tions of remoteness in connection with estates seem to have
come before the English courts. The effect of indefinite
restraint in the alienation of property became manifest, re-
sulting in the passage of the statutes mentioned to give relief.
Notwithstanding the statutes mentioned, in 1576, in the case of
Malnning v, Andrews,2 the court indicated that if a devise be
made to one for life, and then to his heir for life, and so from
heir to heir in perpetuam for life, by use of special words,
such devise would be good.
2. 1 Leon, 256.
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EXECUTORY DEVISES.
The foundation case, in establishing the period of limi-
tations permissible in the case of an executory devise, is
the famous case known as the Duke of Norfolk case,3 decided
in England in 1685. In that case, the testator attempted to
keep his property in his family and prevent alienation of the
estate for a period of 200 years. It was urged in court, that
a perpetuity is a thing odious in law and destructive of the
commonwealth; that it would put a stop to commerce and
prevent the circulation of the riches of the kingdom, and
should not be countenanced in equity; that if in equity one
should come nearer to a perpetuity than the rules of common
law would admit, all men, being desirous of continuing their
estates in their families, would settle their estates by way of
trusts. Upon consideration of the case, the Court held that
a future interest might be limited to commence on a contin-
gency which must occur within lives in being, and thus was
stated the basis of limiting estates by executory devises.
The second important case, in the development of the
rule in question, is the case decided in England in 1736,
Stephens v. Stephens.4 In the Stephens case it was held-
(1) An executory devise to a child living at testator's death
and on such child reaching majority, was good; (2) if a
devise be given to a posthumous child, there could be no
alienation until he should attain the age of twenty-one. It
is now held, that the term of 21 years need have no reference
to the minority of the devisee, nor indeed to any minority
at all.
The third important case, is the ease decided in England
in 1793, Taylor v. Biddall.5 In that case the Court held, as
the power of alienation will not be restrained longer than the
3. 3 Ch. Cas. 1.
4. 25 Reprint Eng. Cas. 751.
5. 2 Mod. Cas. 289.
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law restrains it, namely: during the infancy of the first taker,
the restraint cannot reasonably be said to extend to a per-
petuity.
The principles announced in the three cases mentioned
became embodied in the rule against perpetuity, as applied
to interests created by way of executory devise. These prin-
ciples were adopted by the sages hearing the cases, who
deemed that a reasonable restraint against alienation of
property should be enforced, and, at the same time, had the
wisdom to realize that perpetual restraint would be unNVise
and would become a shackle upon posterity. The principles
have been repeatedly affirmed in the courts of England and
in the courts of our various States. In a number of our
States the period has been cut down by statute and the rule
as originally adopted does not now apply in such States.
MODERN CASES OF GENERAL INTEREST.
The case of Cadell v. Palmer,6 decided in England in
1832, is an interesting case bearing on the rule against per-
petuities. The will provided the trust should continue for
120 years, if any of the persons named should so long survive,
otherwise until the death of the last survivor, and then in
trust for twenty additional years. Of the persons during
whose lives the trust was to continue, there were twenty-
eight persons living at the death of the testator, of whom
seven only were to take interests under the devise. The trust
was sustained.
The case of Madison v. Larman,7 decided in Illinoig in
1897, is an interesting Ameriean case. In that case, the trust
was for the life of the survivor of Seventeen persons living
at the death of the testator. The trust was sustained.
The case of FitWhie v. Brown,8 decided by United States
6. 6 Reprint Eng. Cas. 956.
7. 170 I1. 65.
8. 211 U. S. 321.
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Supreme Court in 1906, is an interesting case from Hawaii.
The testator devised real estate valued at $128,000 and be-
queathed personalty valued at $121,000 in trust "for as long
as is legally possible, the termination or ending of said trust
to take place when the law requires it under the statute."
It appears that testator bequeathed annuities for the life
of more than forty beneficiaries. The Court expressed itself
thus: "We see no reason for holding that the number of
annuitants, which it is said exceeds forty, is too large for a
valid limitation of the trust." Under the will the trust is
to continue for twenty-one years after the death of the last
survivor of the life annuitants and 'may continue for some
months longer if there be any beneficiary in gestation.
DUKE OF NORFOLK CASE.
In the Duke of Norfolk case, as above mentioned, the
testator attempted to restrain the alienation of property for
a period of 200 years. The testator did not attempt to create
an accumulating estate, as in the Thellusson case. The facts
in the Duke of Norfolk case may be utilized to demonstrate
the menace to posterity of permitting estates to accumulate
for long periods of time or indefinitely. The Duke of Norfolk
case was decided in 1685. Since that time 238 years have
elapsed. Suppose the testator had directed the accumulation
of the estate to 1923, and suppose his plan had been allowed
to operate, the accumulation would have been enormous. The
value of the estate is not given in the above mentioned report
of the case, so figures of actual value cannot now be used.
Assuming a growth at a yearly rate of increase equivalent
to yearly interest of the decimal value of .045, compounded
annually, in 238 years the sum of $1 would have accumulated
to the amount of $35,454.96. On that basis, it would have
required a fund of only about $28,205.56 to accumulate to
$1,000,000,000 in the 238 years. A reading of the report of
the case gives one the impression that the estate was of con-
siderable value, far in excess of $28,000.
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THE THELLUSSON CASE.
Benjamin Franklin died in 1790. Under codicil to his will
he bequeathed £1,00 to trustees in Boston, to be used for
benevolent purposes. He directed the accumulation of the
fund for 100 years, and the distribution at the end of that
period of about 76% of the then fund, and directed that the
remaining 24% be continued in trust for a second period of
100 years, the amount at the end of the second 100 years to
be finally distributed. An examination of the record of the
Franklin fund shows it has grown at a yearly rate of increase
equal to yearly interest of the decimal value of .044626, com-
pounded annually.
Thellusson died seven years after Franklin. The records
show that Thellusson left real estate in England of an annual
value of £4500 and which it may reasonably be assumed had
a capital value of £90,000. The records also show that Thel-
lusson left a personal estate of the value of £600,000. The
two amounts total £690,000, on a gold parity basis being the
equivalent in dollars of the sum of $3,357,919. From the
records of the Thellusson case, it appears it was estimated
the trust would continue for not less than 70 years and might
possibly continue for 125 years, or practically until the present
time.
If the Thellusson trust had continued until 1923, or 126
years, and if the fund, the equivalent of $3,357,919, had in-
creased at a rate of growth equal to the rate of growth of the
Franklin fund accumulated in Boston at practically the same
time, to-wit: At an interest rate equal to the decimal value
of .044626, compounded annually for 126 years, the fund
would have increased to total of about $822,493,238. At that
rate of growth, it would require 184 years (or until 1981)
for the principal of $3,357,919 to grow to $10,348,158,000, or
to more than recent estimate of total amount of all gold and
silver money in the world.
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Under the rule against perpetuities, as approved in the
Thellusson case, the Thellusson estate might have been con-
tinued in trust, after the death of the last survivor of the
fifteen persons mentioned, for the period of gestation of post-
humous children, if any, and twenty-one years. The full
period of accumulation allowed under the rule is indeed liberal.
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